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Abstract—This paper is concerned with the issue of side
payments between content providers (CPs) and Internet service
(access bandwidth) providers (ISPs) in an Internet that is po-
tentially not neutral. We herein generalize past results modeling
the ISP and CP interaction as a noncooperative game in two
directions. We consider different demand response models (price
sensitivities) for different provider types in order to explore
when side payments are profitable to the ISP. Also, we consider
convex (non-linear) demand response to model demand triggered
by traffic which is sensitive to access bandwidth congestion,
particularly delay-sensitive interactive real-time applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network neutrality continues to be debated as its core eco-
nomic issues as described in, e.g., [8], have not been resolved.
The debate concerns all participants in the enormous and
growing Internet economy: Internet service (access) providers
(ISPs), content providers (CPs, including providers of cloud
computing services), end-user consumers, and government
regulators.
Fig. 1. Side payments issue
In Figure 1, the subscribers of ISP1b directly pay ISP1b
and content provider CP2. CP2’s Internet service provider,
ISP1a, is different from ISP1b. The financial arrangements
at the peering points where the two ISPs exchange traffic are
typically “neutral” in the sense that they are based on traffic
This research was supported by NSF CNS grant 1116626.
aggregates and not on the (application) type of traffic1 [5], [1]
or its origin. Another question of neutrality is whether CP2
also pays ISP1b for access to its subscribers. In the absence
of such a “side payment”, ISP1b might be disincentivized to
locally cache “remote” content providers like CP2, potentially
gaining revenue at the ISP-to-ISP peering points at the expense
of additional downloading delays experienced by ISP1b’s
subscribers. In the following, we will not consider alliances
between independent CPs and ISPs (whose revenues may need
to be dispersed by, e.g., the use of Shapley values [12], [13]),
but we will consider peered “eyeball” ISPs which also earns
revenue as a content provider.
Also, we will not consider the role of advertising revenue
[14] in Figure 1. Indeed, instead of directly subscribed rev-
enues, CPs may earn advertising revenue, e.g., [1] (obviously,
the subscribers ultimately pay by buying the advertised mer-
chandise or services). Note that ISPs have pointed out that end-
users do not necessarily “request” of the CPs the advertising
which the CPs insert into content, and have argued for sharing
of advertising revenue either through side payments from CPs
or for the right to insert their own ads into downloaded content
(the arrangements among the different parties of broadcast
television service may be analogous to the latter scenario).
In the following, we do not extend the model of Figure 1
to study content exchanged peer-to-peer, which is expected to
employ only best-effort (i.e., not usage-priced) service and,
in practice, is often in violation of copyright. The enormous
traffic volume associated with p2p activity was one of the
original motivators of the neutrality debate [3], and issues of
piracy continue to be developed, e.g., [16]. Multiple types of
content were previously modeled in, e.g., [5].
Finally, we do not consider user migration among multiple
ISPs of the same type as in, e.g., [5].
In this paper, we consider the simpler model of side pay-
ments depicted in Figure 1 on an end-user platform ([9], [14]
developed games involving end-users and content providers
on an ISP platform). We review the case of a noncooperative
ISP-CP game based on a communal demand response for
1Note that differentiated service (diffserv) among application types is
“neutral” if requested by end-users, whereas application diffserv implemented
unilaterally by an ISP is not application neutral (whether implemented at ISP
peering points or at end-user access points, and even if for altruistic purposes,
e.g., to give more bandwidth for putative interactive real-time applications).
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providers of both types in Section II. The case of different,
though coupled, demand responses for each type of provider
is given in Section III to explore the issue of profitability of
side payments. In Section IV, we consider a convex demand-
response corresponding to acceleration in the demand for
reserved bandwidth by delay-sensitive (particularly interactive
real-time) applications once access bandwidth is congested;
the case of a communal demand response is taken here to
simplify analysis. In Section V, we consider an example of
a differentiable, convex demand-response for side-payments2
between two different types of providers. In an appendix, we
also consider a different model involving two different eyeball
ISPs connected at peering point(s) where revenue is generated
corresponding to net traffic transmitted. Finally, we conclude
in Section VI with a short summary.
II. BACKGROUND: COMMUNAL DEMAND RESPONSE OF AN
END-USER PLATFORM
Suppose there are two providers, one content (CP indexed
2) and the other access (ISP indexed 1). Also, the communal
consumer demand [7] is assumed to be
D = Dmax − d(p1 + p2),
where d is demand sensitivity to the price, and Dmax > 0 is
the demand at zero usage based price3. The revenue of the
ISP is
U1 = (p1 + ps)D, (1)
where ps is the side payment from content to access provider.
Similarly, the revenue of the CP is
U2 = (p2 − ps)D. (2)
Consider a noncooperative game played by the CP and ISP
adjusting their prices, respectively p2 and p1, to maximize
their respective revenues, with all other parameters fixed4.
The question whether the ISP will profit from side payments
is not trivial because the side payment will naturally cause
the CP to raise its prices thus lowering overall demand. The
short proof of following simple result follows from [2], [5]
and is included here in order to subsequently relate it to the
principal results of this paper. We assume that the ISP will
decide that it profits from side payments only if this profit is
strictly increasing in ps at ps = 0.
Theorem 1. At the interior Nash equilibrium5, requiring
|ps| < Dmax
3d
, (3)
the ISP does not profit by the introduction of side payments.
2See [19] for a recent reference on side payments.
3Note that ISPs are continuing to depart from pure flat-rate pricing (based
on access bandwidth) for unlimited monthly volume, e.g., [15], [4].
4In particular, the fixed side-payment ps is here assumed regulated. Note
that the utilities are linear functions of ps so that if ps were under the control
of one of the players, ps would simply be set at an extremal value.
5In this paper, we do not consider boundary Nash equilibria, where at least
one player is selecting an extremal value for one of their control parameters,
often resulting in that player essentially opting out of the game, or maximally
profiting from it at the expense of the other player.
Note that the sign of ps may be negative, i.e., the side payment
is from ISP to CP (i.e., remuneration for content instead of
access bandwidth).
Proof: The conditions for Nash equilibrium are:
0 = ∂U1/∂p1 = Dmax − d(2p1 + p2 + ps),
0 = ∂U2/∂p2 = Dmax − d(p1 + 2p2 − ps).
So, the Nash equilibrium plays are
p∗1 =
Dmax
3d
− ps,
p∗2 =
Dmax
3d
+ ps.
Based on the previous two displays, we can see the require-
ment of (3) for an interior Nash equilibrium (i.e., p∗1, p
∗
2 > 0
and D∗ > 0).
The ISP’s revenue at this Nash equilibrium is
U∗1 =
D2max
9d
.
So, U∗1 does not depend on ps, i.e., it is constant, so not strictly
increasing at ps = 0.
In [5], we showed that the the ISP may actually experience
a reduction in revenue/utility with the introduction of side
payments, using a communal demand model that had different
demand-price sensitivity parameters d per provider type and
also multiple providers of each type. Such a model was also
considered in [1]. The following section fleshes this out for a
special case.
III. DIFFERENT DEMAND RESPONSE DEPENDING ON
PROVIDER TYPE
Several other previous works have used a communal de-
mand function for both content and access bandwidth even
though these are two different commodities with different di-
mensions. This said, demand for content and access bandwidth
may be coupled in that pricing of one will affect the other.
So, consider two different, coupled demand responses for
providers of type k ∈ {1, 2}:
D1 = Dmax,1 − d1(p1 + p2), (4)
D2 = Dmax,2 − d2(p1 + p2),
where we have maintained the same (a single) price sensitivity
dk for each type of demand Dk for simplicity. For example,
the ISP’s demand could be in terms of Mbps= [D1] while the,
e.g., music CP’s demand could be in terms of songs/s= [D1].
The point is that a single song’s size could vary from say
3−15MB so, though correlated, the CP and ISP demands are
different.
A. Side payments as a function of consumed access bandwidth
Suppose the side payments based on consumed access
bandwidth are factored as follows:
U1 = (p1 + ps)D1 and U2 = p2D2 − psD1. (5)
Again, in this setting, we wish to find conditions on the of
demand sensitivities di and usage-based side payment price
ps such that side payments are of value to the ISP.
Theorem 2. The introduction of bandwidth based side pay-
ments (5) will profit the ISP if and only if either
min{2Dmax,2
Dmax,1
, 1} > d2
d1
(6)
or
max{2Dmax,2
Dmax,1
, 1} < d2
d1
. (7)
Proof: Let p = p1 + p2 and δk = Dmax,k/dk. After
solving the first order conditions ∂Uk/∂pk = 0, k ∈ {1, 2},
we get that at Nash equilibrium,
p∗ =
1
3
(δ1 − ps + δ2 + d1
d2
ps),
p∗1 + ps = δ1 − p∗.
Thus, at Nash equilibrium,
U∗1 =
d1
9
(2δ1 − δ2 + (1− d1
d2
)ps)
2.
So,
∂U∗1
∂ps
=
2d1
9
(1− d1
d2
)(2δ1 − δ2 + (1− d1
d2
)ps). (8)
This quantity is positive at ps = 0 if and only if (6) or (7)
hold.
So, in this setting, positive side payments are not necessarily
profitable to the ISP (player 1).
B. Discussion
Potentially different sensitivities to each price for each type
of demand were considered in [11], i.e., Dk = Dmax,k −
dk,kpk − dk,3−kp3−k for k ∈ {1, 2}, as well as competition
among multiple providers, thus extending the previous two
theorems. There it was found that the ISP may not profit by
the introduction of positive side payments, depending on the
parameters in play, but numerically this was only the case
when there was only one provider of each type.
More generally, U∗1 is a complex nonlinear function of ps
where it is possible that U∗1 (ps) might be greater than U
∗
1 (0)
for some sufficiently large ps notwithstanding
∂U∗1
∂ps
(0) < 0.
We expect that side payments will be simply rejected by ISPs
in the event that ∂U
∗
1
∂ps
(0) < 0.
C. Discussion: Side payments as a function of consumed
content
Instead of (5), suppose side payments are based on content
and factored as follows:
U1 = p1D1 + psD2, U2 = (p2 − ps)D2.
Because total revenue U1 + U2 is a constant function of ps,
the ISP’s profit is at the CP’s expense, i.e., ∂U∗1 /∂ps > 0
if and only if ∂U∗2 /∂ps < 0. So, the latter condition is
similar to that of Theorem 2 with the indices swapped and the
resulting modified conditions (6) or (7) are for profitability of
the content provider.
Corollary 1. The introduction of content based side payments
will be profitable to the content provider (i.e., a loss for the
ISP) if and only if
min{2Dmax,1
Dmax,2
, 1} > d1
d2
or
max{2Dmax,1
Dmax,2
, 1} < d1
d2
.
IV. ACCESS BANDWIDTH CONGESTION AFFECTING
DEMAND RESPONSE
For simplicity, in this section we return to the communal
demand response scenario of (1) and (2). In the following
section, we will consider an example of different demand
responses for the problem context of this section.
Suppose that there are two broad classes of applications, one
of which is significantly sensitive to congestion of access band-
width, e.g., delay-sensitive interactive real-time applications.
Assume that applications of the other, best-effort type are un-
likely to engage in usage based-pricing for access bandwidth.
As pricing reduces, the demand for access-bandwidth reserva-
tion increases, so causing additional congestion so that best-
effort service will be increasingly inadequate for congestion-
sensitive applications. Therefore, the demand for usage-priced
access-bandwidth reservation may accelerate with reduced
price. More specifically, say there is positive threshold
Dθ < Dmax
such that overall demand sensitivity to price is greater when
D ≥ Dθ than when D < Dθ. That is, for
dmax > dθ,
a convex, piecewise linear model for access bandwidth would
be
D(p) = max{Dmax − dmaxp, Dˆθ − dθp}, (9)
where
Dˆθ = Dθ + (Dmax −Dθ)dθ/dmax,
pθ = (Dmax −Dθ)/dm,
pmax = Dˆθ/dθ = pθ +Dθ/dθ,
so that D(pθ) = Dθ, see Figure 2.
So, in this model, in the price range [pθ, pmax] (demand
range [0, Dθ] equivalently) corresponds to low demand sen-
sitivity to price, dθ. The pricing range [0, pθ] (demand range
[Dθ, Dmax]), when delay-sensitive applications typically need
to adopt usage-priced (reserved or priority) access-bandwidth
service, corresponds to higher demand sensitivity to price,
dmax.
1) Interior Nash equilibrium points: Let p := p1 + p2 so
that
∂U1
∂p1
=
{
Dmax − dmax(p+ p1 + ps) if p > pθ
Dθ − dθ(p+ p1 + ps) if p < pθ
∂U2
∂p2
=
{
Dmax − dmax(2p− p1 − ps) if p > pθ
Dθ − dθ(2p− p1 − ps) if p < pθ
Fig. 2. Convex, piecewise linear demand-response
We take three cases for an interior Nash equilibrium point
(NEP) (p∗1, p
∗
2) based on comparing p
∗ := p∗1 + p
∗
2 to pθ.
Case p∗ > pθ: Adding the first order necessary conditions here
gives p∗ = 2Dmax/(3dmax). Checking “consistency” with the
case condition requires p∗ = 2Dmax/(3dmax) > pθ, i.e., if
3Dθ > Dmax and |ps| < p∗/2, (10)
then an interior NEP is p∗1 = p
∗/2− ps and p∗2 = p∗/2 + ps.
Case p∗ < pθ: Similarly, if
p∗ =
2Dθ
3dθ
<
Dmax −Dθ
dmax
= pθ and |ps| < p∗/2, (11)
then an interior NEP is p∗1 = p
∗/2− ps and p∗2 = p∗/2 + ps.
Case p∗ = pθ. Here, for an interior NEP, ∂Uk∂pk |pθ− > 0 and
∂Uk
∂pk
|pθ+ < 0 for k = 1, 2. That is, we have the following
constraints on p1 + ps:
Dmax − dmax(pθ + p∗1 + ps) < 0
Dθ − dθ(pθ + p∗1 + ps) > 0
Dmax − dmax(2pθ − p∗1 − ps) < 0
Dθ − dθ(2pθ − p∗1 − ps) > 0
Equivalently, for an interior NEP in this case
max{ Dθ
dmax
− ps, 2pθ − Dθ
dθ
− ps, 0} < p∗1
< min{Dmax − 2Dθ
dmax
− ps, Dθ
dθ
− pθ − ps, pθ},(12)
where we have also used 0 < p∗1 ≤ p∗ = pθ (the equality for
this case).
For (10) and (11), the issue of profitability of side payments
for the ISP (player 1) is just as in Theorem 1.
A. Numerical examples for piecewise-linear demand response
Consider the numerical example where Dmax = 2.5 ·Dθ =
1, dmax = 5dθ = 1 (both set equal to 1 without loss of
generality). So, pθ = (1 − 0.4)/1 = 0.6. Condition (10)
clearly holds, giving the corresponding NEP if |ps| < p∗/2,
but conditions (11) and (12) cannot hold.
For a second numerical example, take Dmax = 6Dθ = 1
and dmax = 6dθ = 1. In this example, (10) and (12) cannot
hold. Here, p∗ = 2/3 < 5/6 = pθ, so (11) does hold giving
the corresponding NEP if |ps| < p∗/2.
For a final numerical example, take Dmax = 4Dθ = 1
and dmax = 5dθ = 1. Here, pθ = (1 − 0.25)/1 = 0.75 and
pmax = pθ + Dθ/dθ = 2. In this example, (10) and (11) do
not hold; but when ps < 0.5, (12) reduces to
0.25− ps < p∗1 < 0.5− ps. (13)
That is, there is a Nash equilibrium line segment (p∗1, p
∗
2) such
that p∗1 satisfies (13) and p
∗
2 = pθ−p∗1 = 0.75−p∗1. See Figure
3 for the case whter ps = 1/8. In Figure 4, we depict the
vector field (∂U1∂p1 ,
∂U2
∂p2
) as a function of (p1, p2), corresponding
to “better-response” time-differential, synchronous-play Jacobi
dynamics [10], [17],
dpk
dt
=
∂Uk
∂pk
− pk, for k = 1, 2,
of this noncooperative game between ISP and CP.
Fig. 3. Nash equilibrium line segment when Dmax = 4Dθ = 1, dmax =
5dθ = 1, and ps = 1/8.
V. DIFFERENTIABLE, CONVEX DEMAND MODEL
We can also consider a convex, differentiable demand model
that can approximate (9), specifically
D(p) = Dmax(1− p/pmax)α, (14)
where p = p1+p2. Here, α ≥ 1 and given dmax > dθ > 0 and
0 < Dθ < Dmax, pmax may be found using D′(0) = −dmax
and D′((D)−1(Dθ)) = D′(pθ) = −dθ,
In this section, we first study the system described above for
this model of demand response. We then consider a different
system of two different “eyeball” ISPs (i.e., combined CPs and
ISPs) with an inter-provider service-level agreement (SLA)
involving a revenue based on net traffic flow across their
peering point(s).
Fig. 4. Vector field of the game with Dmax = 4Dθ = 1, dmax = 5dθ = 1,
and ps = 1/8.
A. Interior Nash equilibria and side-payments under different
demand-response for each type of provider
Theorem 3. At interior Nash equilibrium for a strictly convex
demand response,
p∗1 = p
∗/2− ps and p∗2 = p∗/2 + ps, (15)
where p∗ = p∗1 + p
∗
2 solves
2D(p∗) + p∗D′(p∗) = 0. (16)
and |ps| < p∗/2.
Proof: Again, (16) is the sum of the first-order conditions
for a NEP,
∑
k ∂Uk/∂pk = 0. Conclude by substituting p
∗ into
each first-order condition to obtain (15).
For the example of (14) with α > 1,
p∗ =
2
2 + α
pmax,
U∗1 =
p∗
2
D(p∗) =
pmax
2 + α
(
1− 2
2 + α
)α
.
Again, note that under communal demand-response, neither
p∗ = p∗1 + p
∗
2 nor U
∗
1 depend on ps. This is obviously not
necessarily the case when the demand-response for ISP and
CP are different as in the previous section and [11]. So, now
suppose for this example that the CP and ISP demands differ,
but only in the Dmax parameter, i.e.,
U1 = Dmax,1(1− (p1 + p2)/pmax)α(p1 + ps),
U2 = Dmax,2(1− (p1 + p2)/pmax)αp2
−Dmax,1(1− (p1 + p2)/pmax)αps.
For this example, at the interior Nash equilibrium
∂U∗1
∂ps
(0) =
Dmax,1(
α
2+α )
α(Dmax,2 −Dmax,1)(1 + α)
Dmax,2(2 + α)
.
So, the introduction of access-bandwidth based side payments
will be profitable to the ISP, i.e., ∂U
∗
1
∂ps
(0) > 0, if and only if
Dmax,2 > Dmax,1.
A similar result can be likewise derived for content-based side-
payments.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we considered three different problems mod-
eling demand response in an access network game. The
first was to explore the profitability of side payments under
(reasonably) different demand response for ISP and CP. We
found that side-payments from the CP to the ISP were not
unconditionally profitable for the ISP. The second problem
analyzed a convex demand response (taken to be communal to
simplify analysis) that was used to model the onset of demand
for access bandwidth by delay-sensitive applications once the
access is sufficiently congested. Note that the former problem
is one pertaining to the network neutrality debate, while the
latter problem setting would be application neutral if prefer-
ential treatment (service priority or bandwidth reservations)
of applications by the ISP is performed at the behest of the
consumer/user.
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APPENDIX: TWO DIFFERENT EYEBALL ISPS
We now consider a game focusing on two different eyeball
ISPs, denoted by subscripts “a” and “b”, on a platform of
users and CPs, i.e., the ISPs also serve as CPs so no separate
pricing by CPs is modeled. For k, j ∈ {a, b}, the demand for
ISP k’s content is Dk(pj) when it is based on ISP j’s access-
bandwidth price pj . In the following, the same price pj will
be used by ISP j irrespective of content source, i.e., content
is neutrally priced in this sense.
Suppose there are peering points between these two ISPs
where net transit traffic flow in one direction will correspond to
net revenue for the (net) receiving ISP at rate pt from the (net)
transmitting ISP6. See [6], [18] for recent studies of models of
transit pricing for a network involving a transit ISP between
the content providers and end-user ISPs.
Without caching, transit traffic volume is obviously max-
imal and remote content may be subject to additional delay
possibly increasing demand (reducing demand sensitivity) for
usage-priced bandwidth reservations. However, poorer delay
performance may instead reduce demand for remote content or
cause subscribers to change to ISPs that cache remote content.
Let Φk be the fraction of remote demand that is not cached by
ISPk. By simply separately accounting for the demand by two
different user populations with similar content preferences, we
take the utilities as:
Ua(pa) = Da(pa)pa + [ΦbDa(pb)− ΦaDb(pa)]+pt,
Ub(pb) = Db(pb)pb + [ΦaDb(pa)− ΦbDa(pb)]+pt,
where [x]+ := max{x, 0} in the second (transit revenue)
terms. So, we have assumed different “upstream” congestion
points for local and remote traffic and no revenue from cached
(best-effort) traffic. Note that Φk ≤ 1 will be chosen by
ISPk at its minimal value, which we here assume to be
strictly positive again because an ISP that does not cache any
remote content may lose subscribers, or demand for remote
content may be reduced, owing to poor delay performance.
We will also assume that pt is fixed and, by volume discount,
pt < min{pa, pb}.
We study this system for an example of convex demand.
Again suppose, for k ∈ {a, b},
Dk(p) = Dmax,k(1− p/pmax)α,
6For example, France telecom charges pt =$3/Mbps, whereas pricing from
the DSLAM to core, i.e., access bandwidth, for their content providers is
$40/Mbps. This said, many existing peering agreements among non-transit
ISPs have no transit pricing, i.e., pt = 0.
where the maximal price pmax > 0 and α ≥ 1 are also
assumed to be common parameters for both ISPs. Without
loss of generality, assume the demand factor
δ := Dmax,b/Dmax,a < 1, (17)
i.e., demand for ISP a’s content is generally higher than that
of ISP b. Also define the caching factor
ϕ := Φb/Φa. (18)
Case ΦbDa(p∗b) > ΦaDb(p∗a): The first order conditions for
Nash equilibrium are
D′a(pa)pa +Da(pa)− ΦbD′b(pa)pt = 0
D′b(pb)pb +Db(pb) = 0.
The solution here is:
p∗b =
1
1 + α
pmax < p
∗
a = p
∗
b +
αΦbδ
1 + α
pt.
The requirement pt < p∗b < p
∗
a < pmax gives the following
condition on pt for an interior equilibrium in this case:
pt
pmax
< min
{
1
1 + α
,
1
Φbδ
}
.
Adding the case condition, ΦbDa(p∗b) > ΦaDb(p
∗
a), gives
pt
pmax
< min
{
1
1 + α
,
1− (ϕ/δ)1/α
Φbδ
}
. (19)
Note that we require ϕ < δ (caching factor is less than demand
factor), otherwise this bound is pt < 0. In particular, this
implies that ϕ < 1 because of (17).
Case ΦbDa(p∗b) < ΦaDb(p∗a): Now,
p∗a =
1
1 + α
pmax < p
∗
b = p
∗
a +
αΦa/δ
1 + α
pt.
Again, for an interior Nash equilibrium, the case condition
itself is an additional parametric constraint. Here, these re-
quirements lead to:
pt
pmax
< min
{
1
1 + α
,
1− (δ/ϕ)1/α
Φa/δ
}
.
So, here we require ϕ > δ so that pt > 0.
